The Tone Dilemma: Comparing the Effects of Flattery and Verbal Aggression in a Political Speech by Cavazza, Nicoletta
1 
 
Running Head: FLATTERY AND VERBAL AGGRESSION IN POLITICAL 
COMMUNICATION 
 
The Tone dilemma: Comparing the Effects of Flattery and Verbal Aggression in a Political 
Speech 
Nicoletta Cavazza1 
Abstract 
In the realm of political communication, the effects of personal verbal attacks on political 
opponents have long been studied. However, less well understood are the effects of flattery on such 
opponents. We present an experiment showing that praising a political opponent elicits an 
audience’s positive emotions, which in turn positively influences source trustworthiness, and 
ultimately increases the likelihood of voting for that source. In contrast, attacking an opponent 
elicits aversion, which in turn negatively influences source trustworthiness, thus reducing the 
likelihood of voting for the source. 
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The use of aggressive tone against rivals has almost become routine during political debates. The 
effects of this communicative tactic on audience have been considerably studied. Research showed 
that negative propaganda may affect the impression an audience forms about both the target (e.g., 
Fridkin & Kenney, 2011) and the source of the negative messages (e.g., Nau & Stewart, 2014), both 
at explicit and implicit level of attitude (Carraro & Castelli, 2010). Use of negative propaganda may 
also influence voter turnout (e.g., Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Martin, 2004), and voter 
preferences (e.g., Arceneaux & Nickerson, 2010). Unfortunately, studies are largely inconclusive as 
to whether the adoption of a negative and aggressive tone is actually advantageous for a political 
candidate (Lau, Sigelman, & Rovner, 2007). In this regard, a critical distinction has been made 
between messages attacking an opponents’ personality or behavior (i.e., person-based), and those 
pointing to political programs (i.e. issue-based). The former strategy risks backfiring on the source 
impression, whereas issue-based criticisms seem less risky, or even useful (Lau & Pomper, 2001).  
In order to capture the effects of such negative strategies, experimental studies often include 
a “positive” control condition, in which the source develops the message around his/her own 
characteristics or political proposals. Considerably less attention has been devoted to studying the 
effects of symmetrical “positive” messages, i.e. those in which the source flatters the rival. This 
scant attention is probably due to the fact that it is not common to find a political debate where a 
politician flatters the other. However, given the backfire effect induced by the negative personal 
attack and the persuasive effects of arguing against one’s own interest (Burgoon, 1993; Petty, 
Fleming, Priester, & Feinstein, 2001), it may well be that such strategies are beneficial.   
In an attempt to provide this insight, I present an experimental study directly comparing the 
effects induced by a fictitious politician who, during a speech, simply mentions his/her rival 
(control condition), or addresses a verbal attack (negative message condition) or a compliment 
(positive message condition) to the rival. 
Personal Attack Effects 
3 
 
Research about negative campaigns has shown that personal attacks rarely achieve the goal of 
convincing the audience of the negativity of the target; instead, they may provoke a negative 
judgment about the source (e.g., Budesheim, Houston, & DePaola, 1996; Carraro & Castelli, 2010). 
Such a boomerang effect has been explained both as the outcome of an inference mechanism (e.g., 
Carraro, Gawronski, & Castelli, 2010), and as the effect of an emotional reaction (Russo, 2011; 
2016). Indeed, Gawronski and Walther (2008) showed that individuals observing one person 
evaluating another (either in positive or negative terms) tend to attribute the observed evaluation to 
the source. For example, people tend to infer that someone conveying negative information about 
other people is unlikeable. This has been called the “transfer of attitudes recursively” (TAR) effect 
(Gawronski, & Walther, 2008). In this line of reasoning, Carraro, et al. (2010) found that 
respondents expressed a less positive explicit evaluation of a fictitious politician when he criticized 
his opponent, in comparison to when he positively described himself. 
In addition, scholars also have shown that negative propaganda strategies stimulate in the 
audience negative emotions targeted in particular toward the source (e.g., Haddock, & Zanna, 
1997). According to affective intelligence theory (Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000), people 
react to political information through the activation of different emotions which can be clustered 
into two emotional systems: dispositional and surveillance. In particular, enthusiasm and aversion 
are part of the dispositional system that activates habitual approach and avoidance in respect to the 
source of those emotions. In contrast, a reaction of anxiety activates the surveillance system, 
warning that something potentially threatening needs more conscious attention. In this case, the 
attention will be focalized on the source of the threat. Thus, within the framework of affective 
intelligence theory, recent studies (Russo, 2011, 2016) found that person-based attacks, especially 
when coming from a candidate of the preferred party, elicit aversion toward the source that 
mediates the (negative) effect on the likelihood of voting for that source.  
However, studies on the effect of negative propaganda are often based on experimental 
designs which compare the effects of negative political messages with those of “positive messages”, 
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i.e. messages focused instead on the political program promoted (e.g., Arcenaux & Nickerson, 
2010), or on the competence and morality of the source (e.g., Carraro, et al., 2010). Therefore, the 
experimental conditions differ both in the message tone (positive vs. negative) and in the target of 
the communication (source vs. opponent; source’s vs. opponents’ political program). To date, we do 
not know whether a genuinely positive statement, i.e. a compliment flattering the political rival may 
induce positive effects on the source, since empirical evidence issued from a direct comparison 
between negative and positive person-based claims are still lacking. 
Flattery Effects 
Addressing a compliment to someone is a means of ingratiating the interlocutor and affecting 
source evaluation and target compliance (Jones & Wortman, 1973). The persuasive effects of 
flattery have been mainly studied in the realm of interpersonal communication or commercial 
interaction (Grant, Fabrigar, & Lim, 2010; Gordon, 1996; Seiter, 2007; Seiter & Dutson, 2007). 
Beyond the influence of flattery on relevant targets, it has been shown that a flattering remark can 
have an effect that spread to observers, when it is expressed in the presence of other people who 
then form their own impression of the source (Campbell & Kirmani, 2000; Vonk, 2002). This is 
interesting for the case of a political candidate who flatters the rival, not in order to gain his/her 
approval, rather to gain positive evaluation and acceptance from the observing audience. 
Unfortunately, sound evidence for this effect is, at best, scant. 
A recent experimental study carried out in the political domain included the manipulation of 
appreciation directed to a rival during a public speech (Cavazza, 2016). Results showed that being 
exposed to a political candidate who flattered the rival (vs. control condition without the 
appreciation) improved the perception of source trustworthiness (but did not affect perception of 
source competence), and indirectly increased the likelihood of voting for that candidate. These 
findings were interpreted in line with the TAR effect (Gawronski & Walther, 2008). In this case, 
observers tend to infer that sources who express positive evaluation of others are likeable. However, 
a different interpretation could be advanced. Flattery directed at political opponents would come as 
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a surprise to people attending a candidate’s speech, as politicians tend to attack their counterparts. 
According to the language expectancy theory (Burgoon, & Miller, 1985) when a source conforms 
more than expected to social norms (i.e. to be kind to one’s own interlocutors), s/he gain positive 
evaluation by the audience. Moreover, praising a rival is seemingly contrary to candidates’ self-
interests. Persuasion research suggests that the violation of expectations regarding what the source 
would argue, and in particular arguing against self-interest, provokes evaluations of source 
trustworthiness and message validity (e.g., Burgoon, 1993; Cialdini, 1984; Eagly, Wood, & 
Chaiken, 1978; Petty, et al., 2001). Therefore, Cavazza’s study (2016) still left some important 
questions unanswered. First, could the surprise caused by flattery have a role in making the strategy 
effective and positively influence the audience? 
Second, the previous study did not directly compare the effects of flattery with those of 
personally attacking the rival. Also, Cavazza’s study did not take into consideration the role of 
emotional reactions elicited in the audience by a positive claim about the rival. Could flattery of a 
rival elicit positive emotions (enthusiasm) with the potential to backfire on the source, just as verbal 
attacks do?  
Finally, the previous study did not consider relevant audiences’ evaluations of the flattered 
target. Indeed, one reason why politicians are so reluctant to flatter opponents may be the potential 
risk of contributing to their opponents’ positive image, which might outweigh their own benefits. 
The present study seeks to answer these questions. 
The Present Study 
In the present study the message tone was experimentally manipulated, whereas the target of the 
positive/negative sentence holds the same (i.e. the political rival). Therefore, I compared the effects 
exerted by a political speech in which the source (a politicians) neutrally evoked the opponent 
(control condition), with those induced by the same speech where a deprecation of the rival 
(negative message), or an appreciation of the same rival (positive message) was embedded. Since 
people also have different normative expectations about appropriateness of communication style for 
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males and females, and verbal aggression in persuasive messages are more expected for male than 
for female source (Burgoon, Dillard, & Ooran, 1983), I also controlled for potential effects of 
source gender, through the attribution of the message to a male vs. a female candidate.  
Following the literature reviewed above, the general hypothesis is that flattery (vs. person-
based attack) of a political opponent facilitates a positive evaluation of the source candidate, and in 
turn enhances the likelihood of voting for him/her. The theoretical framework and previous studies 
illustrated above suggest that this may be due to different mechanisms. Drawing on studies about 
the effects of negative messages, we could expect the following: 
Hypothesis 1a. As a result of the TAR effect, flattery should induce general source liking, 
and source trustworthiness, just as attacks undermine them (Carraro, et al., 2010), whereas, based 
on previous studies concerning both flattery (Gordon, 1996) and political communication effects 
(e.g., Castelli et al., 2009; Cavazza, 2016; Cislak & Wojciszke, 2008), source competence 
evaluation should remain unaffected. 
Hypothesis 1b. Source liking and source trustworthiness should in turn increase the 
likelihood of voting for the source (i.e. indirect or mediation effect of flattery / verbal attack on 
intention to vote through source liking and source trustworthiness). 
Hypothesis 2a. Flattery might elicit a positive emotion (i.e. enthusiasm), just as verbal 
attacks elicit aversion (Russo, 2011, 2016), whereas no influence should be observed for anxiety.  
Hypothesis 2b. Following the affective intelligence theory, enthusiasm and aversion 
emotions of the dispositional system should drive participants attention to the source instead of the 
target and backfire on source liking and trustworthiness. These evaluations in turn may influence 
the likelihood of voting for the source (two-step indirect effect of flattery / verbal attack on 
intention to vote through enthusiasm / aversion, and source trustworthiness). 
Moreover:  
Hypothesis 3a. Flattery toward a political rival might be perceived as a positive expectancy 
violation, whereas attacks represent a more expected strategy.  
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Hypothesis 3b. Based on the persuasive effects of expectancy violation (Burgoon, 1993; 
Cialdini, 1984; Eagly et al., 1978; Petty, et al., 2001), we should observe a two-step indirect effect 
of the flattery (vs. attacks and control message) on the likelihood of voting for the source through 
the positive expectancy violation that should increase source trustworthiness. 
These hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, the effects of these different 
mechanisms could be cumulative. 
For all three mechanisms, receivers’ attention should be focused on the source, and previous 
studies have, in fact, found that attacks do not achieve the goal of discrediting the target. This is the 
reason why we also expected a negligible effect of flattery on the audience evaluation of the target. 
 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and thirty-eight Italian adults (65.4% women) aged 19-65 years (M = 31.51, SD = 
11.87) were recruited through personal mailing lists, Facebook contacts, and snowball sampling. 
They were highly educated (39.2% of them have a high school degree and the remaining have a 
university or master’s degree). They were also predominantly slightly progressives (51.2%), and 
moderates (22.9%), and mostly workers (45.6%) and students (36.8%). Participants were asked to 
complete an online questionnaire about political communication implemented on the LimeSurvey 
platform.  
Design and Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to the three conditions (type of message: flattering vs. 
attacking vs. control) of a single factor between participants design.  
Having answered three questions about their political interest, information, and their 
participation in politics (political engagement index, Cronbach’s α = .88), participants read the 
following instruction: “Now, imagine that in a few months a local election will be held in your 
town, there are two candidates running for mayor. While exploring the web in order to collect 
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information, you find their pictures, some personal information and a speech one of them has given 
in a recent public meeting during the campaign.”  Some personal information was provided about 
the two candidates (age, education, work, marital status and children) along with their pictures.  
Next, participants read the passage (about 200 words long) from a speech about the 
relationship between young people and politics that had allegedly been given by one of the 
candidates during a meeting (the same passage used in Cavazza’s study, 2016, see Appendix). In 
the control condition, the second sentence of this passage read: “I believe that my competitor will 
agree with me about the need to change this situation.” In the two experimental conditions, this 
same sentence included also a source’s opinion about the competitor (i.e. “I believe that my 
competitor, who is an upright and smart person, will agree…” vs. “I believe that, even though my 
rival has often proved to be unreliable and incompetent, will agree …”).  
I also controlled for a possible effect of a candidate’s gender, manipulating the name of the 
source candidate and the competitor so as to refer either to two men or to two women (respectively 
Paolo Albertelli vs Mario Gambettini and Paola Albertelli vs Maria Gambettini). 
After reading the speech, participants answered a series of questions aimed at assessing 
whether the message was perceived as benevolent/contemptuous toward the rival, how much it 
violated expectations, source trustworthiness, competitor trustworthiness, emotions elicited by the 
message, and likelihood of voting for the source candidate. Finally, they reported their position on 
the left–right political spectrum and completed a standard socio-demographic form. 
Dependent measures 
Perception of message expectancy violation. As a check on whether the candidate’s message 
induced expectancy violation as a function of the experimental conditions, participants responded 
on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 = not at all to 7= very much, to indicate the extent to which they 
perceived the message as surprising, typical for a politicians and expected. An index of message 
expectancy violation was computed as mean of the three items (α = .68). 
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Emotions elicited by the message. Following Marcus, MacKuen, Wolak and Keele (2006) 
and Russo (2011, 2016), participants’ emotional reaction in terms of enthusiasm, anxiety and 
aversion were measured. For each of the three dimensions of emotional response, two items were 
included for which participants had to rate how much the message made them feel (from 1 = not at 
all to 7 = extremely). The scores (after reversing two positive items) were submitted to a factor 
analysis, forcing a three-factor solution. Oblique rotation was used because factors were expected to 
be correlated. The first factor (explained variance 41.74%) included the two items supposed to tap 
aversion (disgust and anger) with factor loadings > .93. The second factor (explained variance 
28.02% included the two items supposed to tap enthusiasm (hope and joy) with factor loadings > 
.91. The third factor (explained variance 15.30%) included the remaining two items supposed to tap 
anxiety (worry and fear) with factor loadings > .93. On this basis, the three emotional indexes were 
computed as item means. 
Impression about the source. Participants evaluated how well they thought six adjectives 
(sincere, reliable, dishonest, skilled, unqualified, and uninformed) described the speaker on a 7-
point scale (from 1 = not at all to 7 = very well). Following previous studies (e.g., Abelson et al., 
1982; Cavazza, 2016; Wojciszke & Klusek, 1996), after reversing the score for the negative item, I 
computed a source trustworthiness index (α = .71) and a source competence index (α = .63). 
Furthermore, one item measured the general liking of the source of the message on a 7-point scale 
(from 1 = not at all to 7 = very much). 
Impression about the competitor. The same six adjectives were used in order to capture 
participants’ impressions about the competitor. Because of low reliability values of the competitor 
trustworthiness index (α = .31), and competitor competence index (α = .39), the analysis was 
performed on a global index of impression about the competitor (α = .58). 
Likelihood of voting for the source candidate. Two questions were put to participants 
regarding the likelihood of voting for the candidate if they were members of the town constituency 
(r = .89).   
10 
 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses and Manipulation Checks 
Preliminary checks on the effect of participant’s gender, political engagement and self-reported 
orientation on the left–right political spectrum showed significant differences of participants’ 
political engagement in the three experimental conditions, F(2,132) = 9.96, p < .001, η2p = .13. For 
this reason, political engagement score was included as a covariate in all the subsequent analysis. 
 Analysis of variance on the two items evaluating the tone of the message showed that the 
speech containing the flattery was perceived as more benevolent (M = 4.53; SD = 1.32) than that 
containing the deprecation (M = 3.13, SD = 1.67), but not different from the neutral one (M = 4.55, 
SD = 1.35), F(1,132) = 14.12, p < .001, η2p = .18. In the same way, the flattering message was 
perceived as less contemptuous toward the rival (M = 2.69, SD = 1.69) than the attacking one (M = 
4.35, SD = 1.66), but not different from the neural one (M = 2.41, SD = 1.37), F(1,132) = 19.90, p < 
.001, η2p = .23. 
Direct Effects of Message Manipulation 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics and intercorrelations for the measures. A series of analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) including the message manipulation (flattery vs. attack vs. control condition) 
and candidate’s gender, were performed on the measures (Table 2). Since the candidate’s gender 
did not affect any of the dependent measures, or interact with the independent variable, I do not 
discuss it further. 
Tone manipulation marginally influenced both general source liking, F(2,134) = 2.75, p = 
.07, η2p = .04, and the perception of the source trustworthiness, F(2,134) = 2.52, p = .08, η2p = .04, 
in the hypothesized direction, whereas no differences emerged in terms of source competence, 
F(2,134) = .86, p = .43 (H1a).1 
In line with H2a, the analysis on enthusiasm revealed the main effect of tone manipulation, 
F(2,134) = 5.99, p = .003, η2p = .08. The flattering message elicited more positive emotions as 
opposed to the attacking one, even though none of them differed from the neutral message at the 
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post-hoc Bonferroni test. The same analysis on aversion showed the significant influence of 
message manipulation, F (2,133) = 3.37, p = .04, η2p = .05. The attacking message elicited more 
aversion than the flattering one, with neither of them differing from the control message at the post-
hoc Bonferroni test. In contrast, no significant effect was observed on anxiety, F (2,134) = .70, p = 
.50. 
Contrary to H3, the same analysis on the perception of expectancy violation revealed no 
significant effects, F(2,134) = .25, p = .78. 
Finally, the independent variable did not directly affect either the impression about the 
competitor, F(2,126) = .50, p = .61, or the likelihood of voting for the message source, F (2,134) = 
1.16, p = .32. 
Indirect Effects of Message Manipulation 
The weak or null influence of message manipulation on general source liking, source 
trustworthiness, competence evaluations, and expectancy violation seen above entails the rejection 
of H1b and H3b on the possible indirect effects of flattery or attack on the likelihood to vote for the 
source through these respondents’ reactions. 
In order to test H2b, two dummy variables were computed from the message manipulation: 
one for the flattery condition (coded 1) vs. the others (coded 0), and one for the attacking conditions 
(coded 1) vs. the others (coded 0). I then verified two two-step models whereby the 
flattering/attacking message induced enthusiasm/aversion, which in turn favours/undermine the 
perception of source trustworthiness, ultimately affecting the intention to vote for the source. To 
this end, I ran Model 6 of PROCESS, the SPSS Macro by Hayes (2013), setting 5,000 bootstrapped 
samples. This analysis allows testing of three indirect paths. The first includes only 
enthusiasm/aversion as the intermediate factor, the second includes only perceived source 
trustworthiness as the intermediate factor, and the third includes the complete sequence depicted in 
Figure 1.  
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Tables 3 and 4 show that the candidate flattering or attacking the rival indirectly influenced 
the likelihood of receiving votes. When the message was flattering, the effect passed through 
positive emotion (enthusiasm), which also entailed source trustworthiness (Figure 1a). When 
attacking the opponent, the source elicited aversion, which in turn weakened perceived source 
trustworthiness, thus reflecting the influence on intention to vote for the candidate (Figure 1b). 
Discussion 
The findings of the present study supported the general hypothesis concerning the persuasive effects 
of praising political opponents, independent of candidates’ gender. This is consistent with a 
previous study in the same field (Cavazza, 2016), which found that a candidate addressing a flattery 
to the rival in a political speech enhanced the audience perception of source trustworthiness and 
indirectly, willingness to vote for that source. In addition, the present study expands this evidence in 
three areas. First, it contributes to a broader understanding of the process through which this effect 
occurs. Previous studies (Carraro et al., 2010; Cavazza, 2016) suggested that an attributional 
process (i.e., TAR effect, Gawronski & Walther, 2008) could be responsible for the source 
experiencing a backfire effect for attacking and flattering the rival. In the present experiment, the 
influence of the message manipulation on source evaluation (i.e. general liking, trustworthiness and 
competence) was rather weak. Instead, the stronger influence of the positive vs. negative tone 
manipulation was observed on the receivers’ emotions of enthusiasm and aversion. Therefore, the 
present findings supported Hypothesis 2 by showing that negative and positive political messages 
stimulate the receivers’ dispositional emotional system as suggested by the affective intelligence 
theory (Marcus et al., 2000). These kinds of emotion do not signal that some threat is at stake; they 
keep people’s attention on the message source, thus affecting evaluation of the candidate and 
intention to vote. Thus, participants’ positive and negative emotional reactions to the message 
seemed to activate the inference process to which the TAR effect refers, even though enthusiasm 
was sufficient to strengthen likelihood of voting for the source. 
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Moreover, the compliment of the rival did not appear as a surprise (i.e. positive expectancy 
violation) to our participants, who were not particularly persuaded by the candidate because s/he 
was arguing against his/her own self-interest. 
In synthesis, the present results confirmed that a genuinely positive appeal (i.e. flattery) is 
able to induce similar effects to those provoked by verbal aggression directed at a political 
opponent. Just as verbal attacks on the personal characteristics of a political rival often backfire on 
the source, because they elicit aversion (Russo, 2011, 2016) and undermine source trustworthiness 
(Carraro et al., 2010), brief appreciation of a rival in a speech revealed similar but positive effects.  
Second, the present experimental paradigm, keeping the target of a compliment or attack 
constant, helps to disentangle the effects of the positive vs. negative message tone from those due to 
different message targets (source candidate vs rival). While previous studies (e.g., Carraro et al., 
2010; King & McConnell, 2003; Lau, et al., 2007) have already shown that attacking a political 
rival is a risky strategy in comparison to promoting one’s own qualities or proposals, our results 
also highlighted that praising a rival may be less risky than insulting him/her.  
Third, the present findings seem to suggest that a positive tone may well be a worthwhile 
communication strategy, as highlighting some good qualities of the competitor did not influence 
participants’ impressions about him/her.2  
Although empirical evidence about the persuasive effect of flattery in the political domain is 
increasingly gaining traction, application of the present evidence to real situations requires caution, 
because results are issued from a very simplified political scenario. Participants did not know the 
political affiliation of candidates, and this may be crucial. However, revealing information about 
candidates’ political orientation risks obscuring the influence dynamics. Future studies could 
overcome this limitation through, for instance, an experimental scenario of primary elections. 
Furthermore, the results concerning indirect effects may suffer from the fact that observed 
constructs share a common method of measurement, thus the intervention of a possible common 
variance bias could not be excluded (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). 
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Despite these limitations, the present findings contribute to the literature on the effects of 
political communication strategies, which until now focused on effects of verbal personal 
aggression and criticisms, in comparison to completely different messages (e.g., messages 
supporting a political proposal). The present findings also broaden knowledge on the potential of 
flattery as a persuasive tactic, providing evidence that observed flattery, previously studied in 
interpersonal context, may also work in one-to-many political communication context. In this 
regard, a promising avenue for future studies is to test the consequence of another “positive” tactic 
political leaders are used to employ in their public speeches: to directly flatter the audience.   
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Notes 
1The ANOVA performed on the global index of impression about the source collapsing all the 7 
items (α = .83), showed a similar marginal effect of the message manipulation, F(2, 134) = 2.36, p = 
.098, η2p = .038. 
2A test of the indirect effect of the flattery message on the impression about the rival through 
positive emotion (controlling for political engagement and trustworthiness of the source) was 
revealed not to be significant (.01, SE = .03, CI: -.04/.08). 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Measures and Intercorrelations (N = 138).. 
Note: *p < .05 level; **p < .001. 
 
 
 
 
  
 M 
(SD) 
Correlations 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1.Source liking 3.75 
(1.35) 
.65** .44** .63** -.14 -.01 .39** .37** .83** 
2.Source 
trustworthiness  
4.13 
(1.11) 
 .62** .45** -.22* -.06 .38** .50** .61 
3.Source 
competence 
4.85 
(.98) 
  .34** -.30** -.11 .19* .48** .39** 
4.Enthusiasm 3.57 
(1.42) 
   .06 .12 .44** .25** .59** 
5.Aversion  2.95 
(1.81) 
    .48** .00 -.13 -.13 
6.Anxiety 2.69 
(1.42) 
     .02 -.06 -.03 
7.Message 
expectancy  
violation 
2.73 
(1.20) 
      .16 .38** 
8.Impression about 
the competitor 
4.25 
(.70) 
       .30** 
9.Likelihood of 
voting for the 
source 
3.76 
(1.36) 
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Table 2. Effects of the Positive vs. Negative Tone of a Political Speech on Dependent Measures 
(means; standard deviations given in parenthesis).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Scales range is 1–7 with higher values indicating greater expectancy violation, more positive 
emotions, more negative emotions, higher source and competitor trustworthiness, and higher 
likelihood of voting for the candidate. Means in a same row that do not share subscripts differ at p < 
.05 (Bonferroni post-hoc test). 
 
  
 Flattery Personal attack Control  
Source liking 4.13 (1.26)a 3.38 (1.44)b 3.73 (1.27)ab 
Source trustworthiness  4.36 (1.09)a 3.83 (.98)a 4.20 (1.12)a 
Source competence 5.02 (1.09)a 4.64 (.86)a 4.91 (.96)a 
Enthusiasm 4.13 (1.34)a 3.06 (1.33)b 3.54 (1.42)ab 
Aversion  2.55 (1.44)a 3.46 (2.07)b 2.81 (1.76)ab 
Anxiety 2.66 (1.49)a 2.88 (1.50)a 2.55 (1.25)a 
Message expectancy  violation 2.85 (1.30)a 2.59 (1.12)a 2.75 (1.19)a 
Impression about the 
competitor 
4.35 (.77)a 4.17 (.61)a 4.24 (.73)a 
Likelihood of voting for the 
source 
4.06 (1.18)a 3.52 (1.42) 3.69 (1.43) 
21 
 
 
 
Table 3. Indirect Effects of Flattery on the Intention to Vote for the Source. 
 Effect SE LLCI ULCI 
Total .47 .18 .14 .83 
Path 1 .29 .12 .11 .57 
Path 2 .03 .10 -.16 .25 
Path 3 .14 .06 .05 .28 
Note.  
Path 1 Flattery  positive emotion  intention to vote for the source 
Path 2 Flattery  source trustworthiness  intention to vote for the source 
Path 3 Flattery  positive emotion  source trustworthiness  intention to vote for the source. 
 
Table 4. Indirect Effects of Verbal Attack on the Intention to Vote for the Source. 
 Effect SE LLCI ULCI 
Total -.31 .16 -.63 .00 
Path 1 -.00 .05 -.12 -.10 
Path 2 -.24 .14 -.52 .05 
Path 3 -.07 .05 -.21 -.00 
Note.  
Path 1 Attack  aversion  intention to vote for the source 
Path 2 Attack  source trustworthiness  intention to vote for the source 
Path 3 Attack  aversion  source trustworthiness  intention to vote for the source. 
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a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R2 = .50, F(4, 133) = 32.98, p < .001. 
 
b 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R2 = .38, F(4, 132) = 20.57, p < .001. 
 
Figure 1. The final models.  
Notes: Path coefficients are β.  
**p < .001; *p < .05.  
Respondents’ political engagement included as covariate. 
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Appendix 
Text of the message in the control condition 
 
“Italy ranks sixth among European countries for its high work cost, 12 points more than the general 
average. I believe that my competitor would agree with me about the need to change the situation, 
above all, in favor of youngsters like you.  
My main objective is to give hope to youngsters’ ideas, providing more and more funding to the 
many start-ups. Thousands of young people have invented their own job and we must encourage 
them to go on. 
I want to invest in your talent, so please help me to demonstrate that believing in, and maintaining, 
the effort may make the dreams come true. You have to do it for those three thousand unemployed 
young people who see their dreams beyond their reach.   
Changing the taxation system on work and incomes and simplifying bureaucracy are the required 
actions and the goals that I, and the party I represent, will pursue in order to create the necessary 
conditions to facilitate ideas’ development, and to increase youth employment and family buying 
power. These actions will make us more competitive both within our borders as well as abroad.” 
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